A general existence theorem was established by Harris [6] . His result applies to games of perfect information in which players' payoff functions are continuous, and their choice sets are compact sets that depend continuously on the choices made previously. In this note we show that any game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equilibrium, assuming only that players' payoff functions are bounded, and continuous at infinity. In this way, we present a method for establishing existence of perfect equilibria in bounded, continuous at infinity games of perfect information: we need only to check whether the particular game we are interested in satisfies enough continuity and compactness properties to guarantee that limits of sequences of outcomes induced by ε−perfect equilibria, with ε converging to zero, are perfect equilibrium outcomes.
1
Our approach consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, in a way that is standard in measure and integration theory (see, for example, Wheeden and Zygmund [10] ). The sequence of approximating payoff functions for each player, in addition to being a sequence of simple functions, satisfies two other important properties: first, 1 That it is enough to focus on outcomes rather than on strategies follows from Börgers [2] , and Hellwig et al. [8] .
it converges uniformly to the payoff function of that player in the original game; and second, any approximating function depends only on finite histories in the following sense: we can find an integer t such that if any two infinite histories coincide in the first t periods, then they yield the same payoff.
The above approximation of each player's payoff function induces a sequence of games that differs from the original game only in the payoff function. For this sequence of games, it is easy to establish that each of them has a perfect equilibrium since they can be solved by backwards induction.
Also, given ε > 0, perfect equilibria of the approximating games far out in the sequence will be ε−perfect equilibria of the original game. Thus, every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equilibrium, for all ε > 0. Furthermore, we can find a subsequence of the approximating games in a way that the set of perfect equilibria of the original game G consists of those strategies that, for all n, are 1/n−perfect equilibria of G n , where {G n } denotes the sequence of approximating games.
Our work is, thus, related to that of Fundenberg and Levine [3] , and [4] , Harris [5] , and Börgers [1] , all of which present characterizations of perfect equilibria in terms of ε−equilibria of truncated games. Our results are also related to the limiting results of Börgers [2] and Hellwig et al. [8] . Our approach differs from theirs essentially in the approximations to a given game that we consider. Given a game G of perfect information, we consider approximating games that differ from G only in the payoff functions; in addition, the sequence of payoff functions of the approximation games converges uniformly to the payoff functions of G. These two properties make it very easy to deal with limiting properties.
Games of Perfect Information
Our notation follows closely upon that used by Harris [6] . There is a finite A game of perfect information is a pair G = (H, P ) where H is a nonempty subset of S, and P : H → R N (the function P i : H → R is player i's payoff function), satisfying the property that at each point in time only one player can make a choice. Formally, for any t ∈ N, and x ∈ H let A t (λ t−1 x) = {y t : y ∈ H, λ t−1 y = λ t−1 x} denote the set of outcomes that are possible in period t given the history λ t−1 x. As players choose indepen-
The assumption that at each point in time only one player can make a choice is formalized by imposing that for all t ∈ N, and x ∈ H, at most one of the sets {A ti (λ t−1 x)} is not a singleton.
A strategy for player i, For ε ≥ 0, a strategy f is an ε−perfect equilibrium of the game G = (H, P )
and t ≥ 0. A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium of the game G = (H, P ) if it is a 0-perfect equilibrium. Let P E(G) denote the set of perfect equilibria of the game G, and P E ε (G) the set of ε−perfect equilibria of the game G.
A game (H, P ) of perfect information is continuous at infinity if for all
. This definition is due to Fudenberg and Levine [3] . A game (H, P ) of perfect information is bounded if for all 
and define G k = (H, P k ). The sequence {G k } is a sequence of simple games that approximate G in the following sense.
Lemma 1 Let G = (H, P ) be a game of perfect information, and assume
that G is continuous at infinity, and bounded. Let G k be as above. Then,
and
and so
Hence,
This establishes 1. Also, it implies that
Note that the game G k has a perfect equilibrium. This follows because each player i is indifferent between every strategy that prescribes the same actions in periods 1 through k. Hence, for t ≥ k + 1, we may specify some arbitrary action for the player choosing in period t independently of the history and use backward induction to specify strategies for players choosing in periods 1 through k. This fact is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For all k ∈ N, G k has a perfect equilibrium.
, since, by definition, we have that
Consider t ≤ k, and assume that {f j } ∞ j=t+1 has already been defined in a
(H), and j ≥ t.
We have that {P
. In order to establish the inductive
(1)
, and let x\y t denote the history that differs from x only because x t was replaced by y t . By the inductive hypothesis, we
Thus we have defined a strategy f with the property that
f is a perfect equilibrium of G k .
By lemma 2, it remains to show that any perfect equilibrium of G k is an ε−perfect equilibrium of G provided that k is sufficiently large. This is shown in the following lemma.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and let K ∈ N be such that
for all k ≥ K. Let k ≥ K and f be a perfect equilibrium of G k . We will show that f is an ε−perfect equilibrium of G.
Part of the interest of approximating a given game G of perfect information by the sequence {G k } of games is that each G k can be solved by backwards induction. This is clearly an important property when one is interested in computing the equilibrium set of any game of perfect information.
Thus, it is interesting to know whether the equilibrium set of any such game G can be computed using the games in {G k }. The following result answers this question.
Theorem 2 Let G = (H, P ) be a game of perfect information, and assume that G is continuous at infinity, and bounded. Let G k be as above. Then, there exists a subsequence {G
Proof. For n ∈ N, let k n be such that ||V
; its existence is guaranteed by lemma 1.
) − 1/n, for all n, and so, by lemma
x, t]). Hence f ∈ P E(G).

Let f ∈ P E(G). It is straightforward to verify that
, and x, y ∈ H. This clearly implies that f is a perfect equilibrium of (H,
An important implication of Theorem 1 is that in order to establish the existence of a perfect equilibrium in a game of perfect information we need just enough continuity to guarantee that limits of ε−equilibria, with ε > 0 converging to zero, exist and are equilibria. Sufficient conditions for this result are given in Reny [9] , which, although stated for normal form games, can be easily adapted to games of perfect information. However, sometimes the above property can be easily established directly. The model of Harris and Vickers [7] provides such an example.
Harris and Vickers [7] have modelled a race: two players, A and B, are in competition for a single indivisible prize, which has value V A for player denote the choices of player A and B, respectively, and define, for k ≥ 1,
the smallest integer n such that either x n ≤ 0 or y n ≤ 0. Finally, the payoff for player A is defined by
and the payoff for player B is defined by
Let G R denote the above game. Clearly, all the assumptions of Theorem 1 of Harris [6] are satisfied, except the continuity of the payoff functions.
However, they are bounded, and continuous at infinity. We will show the existence of a perfect equilibrium by a limit argument involving ε−perfect
equilibria. An important part of the argument consists of showing that P i , i = A, B, is continuous at limit points of ε n −perfect equilibrium outcomes
Proof. Let z ∈ H, and k ∈ N.
Note first that we may assume that under z no player wins the race before
, since in this case the result is obvious.
We will assume that the player that moves in period k +1 is player A,(the case in which the player that moves in period k + 1 is player B is exactly symmetric), and we will consider two cases:
Case 1: Under v, player A wins the race in period l > k.
Let l be such that
Case 2: Under v, player B wins the race.
By the argument above for case 1, it follows that B will win the race under f n , for n large enough. Thus,
Case 3: Under v, neither player wins the race.
We have shown that
The argument presented so far can also be used to show that
in the following way: if neither player wins the race, then the same argument can be used for player B; if player A wins the race under z then
can be shown in the same way we showed that
A second important part of the argument showing existence of a perfect equilibrium through a limit argument involving ε−perfect equilibria consists of defining a strategy which is in some sense a limit of the sequence of ε−perfect equilibria.
and f a strategy satisfying the following properties: for all x ∈ H, and t ∈ N, 
, x, t]).
By Theorem 1, we know that for any bounded, continuous at infinity game there exists a sequence of ε n −perfect equilibria with ε n → 0. Furthermore, the construction in Börgers [2] , and Hellwig et al. [8] shows that given any such sequence we can define f in such a way that properties 1 and 2 above hold since H is compact in G R . Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 G R has a perfect equilibrium.
We note that lemmas 4 and 5 provide a general approach to the question of existence of perfect equilibria in games of perfect information: any bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information for which those lemmas hold, and for which we can construct strategies in the way described in lemma 5, will have at least one perfect equilibrium.
